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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to identify and examine differences in corporate board characteristics 
across four industries.  Using a sample of 2592 US publicly traded firms, eleven board 
characteristics were identified and then examined across manufacturing, retail trade, 
finance/insurance, and services industries.  Our analyses revealed significant differences in each 
of the eleven board characteristics examined.  Implications and areas for future research are 
discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
oards of Directors (BODs) and the topic of corporate governance have received a great deal of 
attention over the past decade.  From cases of financial restatements to excessive CEO compensation, 
the awareness, responsibility, and effectiveness of BODs has been questioned (Arthaud-Day, Certo, 
Dalton, & Dalton, 2006).  Corporate governance can be defined as the determination of the broad uses to which 
organizational resources are deployed and the resolution of conflicts among the many participants in organizations 
(Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003).  Of primary concern is the relationship between a company’s shareholders, board 
of directors, and managers.  An important role of the board of directors is to ensure that the decisions made by top 
managers are in the best interests of the shareholders (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).  Other important roles of the board 
include facilitating access to resources that may be vital to firm success as well as providing advice and counsel to 
management (Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996). 
 
Major theoretical groundings for the role of boards include agency theory, resource dependency theory, and 
institutional theory.  From an agency perceptive boards serve as a monitoring mechanism (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
Resource dependency theory provides a basis for understanding the interdependence of organizations and the ability 
of board members to aid the firm in gaining important resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Institutional theory 
suggests that firms adopt structures or routines for legitimacy reasons and thus boards may take on certain forms and 
characteristics because of expected industry or macro-level business norms (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  When 
considering these theories, a question arises as to whether boards vary based on industry membership.  Prior 
research has examined changes in board characteristics over time (Marlin & Geiger, 2011) while many other studies 
have controlled for industry in their analyses.  However, there is scant research specifically focusing on differences 
in board characteristics across industries.  Depending on industry, it is likely that board profiles could vary due to 
factors such as the complexity of the monitoring function, need or importance of the resource role of the board, and 
finally the potential for norms within a business sector.      
 
The purpose of this study is to identify and examine differences in corporate board characteristics across 
industries.  More specifically, using a sample of 2592 US publicly traded firms, board characteristics were identified 
and then examined across manufacturing, retail trade, finance/insurance, and services industries.  In the next section, 
a brief overview of research on the importance of board characteristics is presented.  Next, the methodology is 
described and the results of the analyses are presented.  Finally, implications and future research areas are discussed. 
    
 
B 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The three organizational theories discussed above provide the rationale for the importance of board 
composition.  From an agency view the purpose of boards is as fiduciaries charged with monitoring management 
(Bainbridge, 1993).  In this perspective, boards serve to minimize the potential for managerial self-interest 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  According to agency theory, superior firm performance accrues to organizations that are able to 
optimally manage their agency costs (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  Thus, independence and the ability to monitor 
management are the driving factors of the board’s impact on firm performance (Booth & Deli, 1996).  The literature 
suggests that board characteristics impact board effectiveness or firm performance (Johnson et al., 1996).  For 
example, prior research suggests that larger boards may increase monitoring strength (Borokhovich, Brunarski, 
Harman, & Kehr, 2005; Miller, 2009) as well as reduce the potential for domination by the CEO (Singh & Harianto, 
1989).  Moreover, a great deal of research has examined the impact of director independence on organizational 
dependence.  For example, Pearce and Zahra (1992) found a positive relationship between director independence 
and firm performance.   
 
Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) highlights the interdependence between 
organizations and their environment suggesting that firms are not self-sufficient and rely on the external 
environment for survival (Hillman, Schropshire, & Cannella, 2007).  To acquire needed resources firms create links 
with the external environment and board members can serve as one of those links (Johnson et al., 1996).  Directors 
can bring to the firm a specific expertise or a connection to a resource such as capital or product supply.   Thus, the 
resource-dependence role of directors suggests board composition will impact external linkages to the firm’s 
environment (Hillman, Cannellas, &Harris, 2002).  For example, larger board size may increase the number of 
external linkages and thus increase the potential for securing needed resources.  Moreover, greater diversity within a 
board may provide for wider ranges of expertise which in turn could result in better decision making.  Board 
diversity may exist in age, tenure, gender, functional backgrounds, professional experiences, and education (Coffey 
& Wang, 1998) as well as in outside board representation (Forbes & Milliken, 1999) and in the number of boards on 
which directors serve. 
 
From an institutional theory perspective boards may take on certain characteristics due to societal or 
business norms and pressures.  Firms may follow such norms in an effort to create legitimacy with stakeholders 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  For example, factors such as societal and institutional pressure to increase diversity on 
boards (Elgart, 1983; Singh, 2005) have added legitimacy to organizations with greater gender diversity (Milliken & 
Martins, 1996).  Given the above it is expected that in addition to societal norms, industry practices may play an 
important role in board composition and thus board characteristics. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample and Data Collection 
 
The sample included all firms in which complete data was available in The Corporate Library® Board 
Analyst database for the year 2007.  This database includes firms in the Fortune 1000, Russell 2000, S&P 500, S&P 
MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 Indices.  From this sample we chose four major industry divisions: 
manufacturing (SIC 2000-3999), retail trade (SIC 5200-5999), finance/insurance (SIC 6000-6799), and services 
(SIC 7000-8999).  The year 2007 was chosen as a recent time frame to examine the relationships of interest and 
since it was the year prior to the 2008 financial crisis.  The final sample consisted of 2592 firms. 
   
Board Characteristic Measures 
 
 Eleven board measures were selected for this study.  These measures include general board characteristics 
such as size and director independence as well as other important areas involving demographics and diversity.  For 
each of the four industries examined variable means were calculated.  Board size was calculated as the total number 
of directors on a given board (excluding Emeritus and Advisory member positions).  Board tenure was calculated 
as the average number of years of service with the firm of board members.  Board age was calculated as the average 
age of board members.  Tenure heterogeneity was calculated as the coefficient of variation for board tenure.  The 
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coefficient of variation is commonly used to capture demographic heterogeneity.  Greater tenure heterogeneity 
suggests greater dispersion in average tenures of board members and thus indicates greater diversity with regards to 
years of service.  Similarly age heterogeneity was calculated as the coefficient of variation for board age, measuring 
the dispersion in the ages of a firm’s board members and thus diversity of age on the board. 
 
 Women directors was calculated as the sum of women directors divided by the total number of all 
directors on a given board.  Outside directors was calculated as the number of independent outside directors 
divided by the total number of all directors on a given board.  Boards directors serve on was calculated as the 
average number of boards that directors of a company serve on.  Five percent ownership was measured as the 
estimated percentage of outstanding shares held by any 5% or greater shareholders as reported in the company’s 
proxy statement.  Institutional majority indicated whether or not a majority of outstanding shares are held by 
institutions.  Directors own zero shares was calculated as the sum of directors who own zero shares of stock 
divided by the total number of all directors on a given board.   
  
Analysis 
 
 Data from the 2592 firms sampled were analyzed using ANOVA and pairwise means comparisons.  
ANOVA was used to test for significant differences in the board characteristics across the four industries examined.  
Pairwise means comparisons were then used to identify the specific differences that existed and their direction. 
 
 
Table 1 Variable Means and Tests for Between Industry Differences in Board Characteristics 
 Industrya 
Variable 1 2 3 4 F Means Comparisons* 
Board Size 8.50 8.73 10.18 8.03 93.80*** 3>2,1>4 
Board Tenure 7.77 8.12 8.70 6.79 22.62*** 3>2,1>4 
Board Age 59.57 58.51 60.18 57.75 34.74*** 3>1>2>4 
Tenure Heterogeneity .745 .776 .682 .701 11.04*** 2,1>4,3 
Age Heterogeneity .135 .140 .140 .146 7.28*** 4>2,3,1 
Women Directors (%) 8.78 13.81 9.83 8.89 17.39*** 2>3,4,1 
Outside Directors (%) 82.26 80.46 81.36 80.39 5.89*** 1>2,4 
Boards Directors Serve On 1.64 1.57 1.39 1.58 44.86*** 1>2,3;4,2>3 
Five Percent Ownership (%) 24.93 25.32 18.84 26.41 22.75*** 4,2,1>3 
Institutional Majority (%) 65.94 60.19 56.16 68.56 8.32*** 4>2,3;1>3 
Directors Own Zero Shares (%) 20.97 19.27 9.07 22.82 49.70*** 4>2,3;1,2>3 
N 1216 212 663 501 2592  
a1=Manufacturing (SIC 2000-3999), 2=Retail Trade (SIC 5200-5999), 3=Finance/Insurance (SIC 6000-6799), 4=Services (SIC 
7000-8999)  
*p<.05;***p<.001 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
 Variables means and tests for differences in board characteristics across the four industry divisions for each 
of the eleven measures examined are presented in Table 1.  Significant overall effects (p<.001) and between industry 
differences using pairwise means comparisons were found for all eleven measures.  More specifically, firms in the 
finance/insurance industry had the highest board size, board age, and board tenure while firms in the services 
industry were the lowest in these areas; firms in the manufacturing and retail trade industries had greater tenure 
heterogeneity than firms in the other industries examined; age heterogeneity was highest in the services industry; 
women directors was highest in the retail trade industry; outside directors was higher in manufacturing than in 
retail trade and services; boards directors serve on was higher in manufacturing than in retail trade and 
finance/insurance and higher in services and retail trade than in finance/insurance; Five percent ownership was 
lowest in finance/insurance; institutional majority was higher in services than in retail trade and finance/insurance 
and higher in manufacturing than in finance/insurance; directors own zero shares was higher in services than in 
retail trade and finance/insurance and higher in manufacturing and retail trade than in finance/insurance.   
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this study was to identify and examine differences in corporate board characteristics across 
four major industry divisions.  More specifically, using a sample of 2592 US publicly traded firms in the year 2007, 
board characteristics were identified and then examined across manufacturing, retail trade, finance/insurance, and 
services industries.  The results of our analyses reveal significant differences in each of eleven board characteristics 
across the four industries examined.  Implications of these results and areas for future research are discussed below. 
  
The findings of this study highlight the impact and importance of industry on board characteristics.  Of 
particular interest are our findings that the finance/insurance industry had the highest board size, board age, and 
board tenure, and the lowest tenure heterogeneity, boards directors serve on, five percent ownership, institutional 
majority and directors own zero shares with the opposite results being found for the services industry.  Thus, the 
greatest differences in terms of number and magnitude were found between the finance/insurance and services 
industry.  Also of interest is that the retail trade industry had a higher percentage of women directors than any of the 
other three industries examined suggesting greater gender diversity in this industry.  Finally, the manufacturing 
industry had the highest percentage of outside directors and the highest average number of boards directors serve on 
which in total suggests a greater level and diversity of resources provided by board members. 
 
 The findings of this study have implications for institutional theory, agency theory, and resource 
dependence theory.  The significant differences between industry board characteristics suggest that isomorphic 
behavior is indeed occurring supporting an institutional theory view.  Firms seem to be paying closer attention to 
and copying the behavior of firms within their own industry versus firms in other industries.  Whether this 
isomorphic behavior is coercive, mimetic, or normative is an important topic for future research.  With regards to 
agency theory, the between industry differences identified suggest differences in the way and the extent to which 
managerial behavior is being monitored.  As examples, manufacturing firms appear to rely on outside directors, 
finance/insurance companies rely on larger boards, and greater monitoring of the managers of firms in the services 
industry appears to be accomplished via large position shareholders and institutional majority ownership.  Finally 
and concerning resource dependence theory, the significant differences found in board size, board age, board tenure, 
tenure heterogeneity, age heterogeneity, women directors, outside directors, and the number of boards directors 
serve on are all suggestive of differences in the diversity of resources brought to firms within each industry by board 
members. 
  
Like most research efforts the current study has limitations that provide opportunities for future research 
efforts.  First, a limitation of the study involves the use of cross-sectional data.  Future research in this area would 
benefit from using longitudinal data and from examining changes in board characteristics over time across different 
industries.  A second limitation involves the limited number of board characteristics examined.  Future researchers 
may benefit from including additional board characteristics or by including observable board measures utilizing 
qualitative research methods.  Finally, we did not examine performance in the current study.  Future research would 
benefit from the examination of performance and of the relationship between board characteristics and performance 
across different industries.  Overall, it is hoped that this study will provide an important contribution to the corporate 
governance literature.  
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